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Outlaw to outcast may be a step forward, but it does not achieve the
full promise of liberty.1
INTRODUCTION
Imagine two Georgians, Pat and Chris, who met and fell in love.
In 2010 they exchanged vows in a ceremony attended by friends and
family, even though the State of Georgia would not legally recognize
their same-sex marriage. Five years later, Pat and Chris celebrated
with their friends when Obergefell was announced, and the two were
the first in line to receive their marriage license.
Just a few weeks later, Pat and Chris’s jubilation was cut short
when Pat was arrested and charged with criminal conspiracy. The
prosecution called Chris to the stand to testify as to a confession Pat
made to Chris a year before. Pat’s lawyer objected and claimed the
statement was privileged as a confidential marital communication,
but the judge overruled the objection. Caught between the law and
love, Chris refused to testify and, although Pat went free, Chris was
thrown in jail for contempt of court.2
* * * 
Although the story of Pat and Chris is entirely fictitious, it is not
without real-world precedent. In 2006 one of the first targets of the
Enron investigation was William Dodson, the same-sex partner of
an Enron executive who could not claim the spousal privilege of not
testifying in court.3 In 2013 a Kentucky court found that a defen-
dant’s same-sex partner could not invoke marital privileges despite
the couple’s Vermont civil union, sinking the defendant’s hopes of
1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
2. One of the defining features of the opinion in Obergefell is its narrative depiction of
the plaintiffs’ lives. See, e.g., Kate Huddleston, Essay, Depicting Minority Petitioners’ Lives
in Appellate Opinions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 87, 88-89 (2016), http://www.pennlawreview.
com/online/164-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-87.pdf [https://perma.cc/38RX-V4VX]; see also Maureen
Johnson, You Had Me at Hello: Examining the Impact of Powerful Introductory Emotional
Hooks Set Forth in Appellate Briefs Filed in Recent Hotly Contested U.S. Supreme Court
Decisions, 49 IND. L. REV. 397, 432-34 (2016). The author of this Note kindly asks the reader’s
patience in replicating a similar narrative.
3. I. Bennett Capers, Enron, DOMA, and Spousal Privileges: Rethinking the Marriage
Plot, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 716-18 (2012).
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being acquitted.4 Indeed, arguments for same-sex marital privileges
have been laughed out of court since at least 1997, when the Ap-
pellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York rejected the
notion that the privilege would extend to “homosexuals in a spousal
relationship.”5 Beyond these examples, many, many more would
probably exist were it not for the “settled law” that the marital com-
munications privilege does not, and has never been expanded to,
include nonmarried couples.6
On the day the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Obergefell
v. Hodges, it seemed as though the decision rendered questions as-
sociated with same-sex spousal privilege moot: the Court declared
that the Constitution requires the recognition of same-sex mar-
riages on the same footing as opposite-sex marriages, with the same
rights, privileges, and benefits.7 Those rights, privileges, and bene-
fits number more than one thousand on the federal level and many
more on the state level.8
Although advocates of same-sex marriage would disagree,9 many
see the decision in Obergefell as fundamentally redefining mar-
riage.10 Leaving that debate aside, it is a fact that the rights,
4. Katharine T. Schaffzin, Beyond Bobby Jo Clary: The Unavailability of Same-Sex
Marital Privileges Infringes the Rights of So Many More than Criminal Defendants, 63 U.
KAN. L. REV. 103, 104-05 (2014).
5. Greenwald v. H & P 29th St. Assocs., 659 N.Y.S.2d 473, 474 (App. Div. 1997). 
6. See infra Part I.B.
7. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
8. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT:
UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT (2004) (identifying “1,138 federal statutory provisions ... in which
marital status is a factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, and privileges”). The
most commonly invoked marital benefits are given by the states, as “[t]he whole subject of
domestic relations of husband and wife … belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws
of the United States.” In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890); see also, e.g., Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 902 n.28 (Iowa 2009) (cataloging over 200 Iowa state statutes affected
by marital status); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954-57 (Mass. 2003)
(discussing the fact that a fraction of the “benefits ... [that] attach to civil marriage ... are set
by the Commonwealth”).
9. See, e.g., Zack Ford, No, the Supreme Court Did Not Just ‘Redefine’ Marriage, THINK
PROGRESS (June 26, 2015, 3:20 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/lgbt/2015/06/26/3674590/
kennedy-marriage-definition/ [https://perma.cc/DU73-KG4J].
10. See, e.g., Helen M. Alvaré, Marriage and Family as the New Property: Obergefell,
Marriage and the Hand of the State, 28 REGENT U. L. REV. 49, 58 (2016) (lamenting the
changes to the definition of marriage emanating from the Obergefell decision); National
Organization for Marriage (NOM) Issues Statement Following US Supreme Court Decision on
Marriage, NAT’L ORG. MARRIAGE: NOM BLOG (June 26, 2015), http://www.nomblog.com/40488/
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benefits, and privileges of marriage have changed dramatically over
the past century: many of the privileges of marriage, such as
immunity from antifornication statutes, have been expanded to
unmarried couples.11 In fact, some argue, the importance of
marriage for same-sex couples is entirely overstated: most of the
benefits of marriage can be contracted privately,12 and those that
cannot are positive benefits the state can dispense as it sees fit.13
However, there are a few benefits that can neither be replicated by
contract nor dismissed as a gratuitous benefit, and chief among
them are the spousal evidentiary privileges.14
The two spousal privileges—the spousal testimonial privilege and
the confidential marital communications privilege15—had been
unavailable in federal court to legally married same-sex couples
until United States v. Windsor,16 and completely unavailable to
same-sex couples that were barred from marriage by state law until
Obergefell.17 Although Obergefell makes the privileges prospectively
[https://perma.cc/HCC4-E7AU] (declaring the Obergefell decision to be “completely illegiti-
mate” and lacking in “both constitutional and moral authority”).
11. See James G. Dwyer, Same-Sex Cynicism and the Self-Defeating Pursuit of Social
Acceptance Through Litigation, 68 SMU L. REV. 3, 12 (2015).
12. For example, the passing of a deceased spouse’s property to the surviving spouse and
hospital visitation rights. These benefits are assignable by contracts outside the marriage
contract. See Mary Bonauto et al., Property Division Issues in Non-Marital Relationships,
GLAD 1 (Dec. 2008), http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/property-division-index.
pdf [https://perma.cc/G5ND-2ALJ]; Hospital Rights, UNMARRIED EQUALITY, http://www.
unmarried.org/health-care/hospital-rights/ [https://perma.cc/M7NK-5BU9].
13. See Alvaré, supra note 10, at 49-50 (arguing that Obergefell transformed marriage into
a government entitlement); Dwyer, supra note 11, at 17-18 (quoting the rule from Deshaney
v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989), that “the Due Process
Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid” to benefits such as joint
tax returns).
14. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8.
15. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 301 (2015).
16. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013).
17. See, e.g., Lisa Yurwit Bergstrom & W. James Denvil, Availability of Spousal Privileges
for Same-Sex Couples, 11 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 224, 227-28 (2011);
Elizabeth Kimberly (Kyhm) Penfil, In the Light of Reason and Experience: Should Federal
Evidence Law Protect Confidential Communications Between Same-Sex Partners?, 88 MARQ.
L. REV. 815, 815-16 (2005); Schaffzin, supra note 4, at 106; John Bergstresser, Note, When
Evidentiary Rules Enforce Substantive Policies: Same-Sex Marital Privilege Under Federal
Rule of Evidence 501 in Diversity Cases, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 303, 306 (2012) (noting that at
that point in time the marital privileges were not available to same-sex couples in federal
court); Jennifer R. Brannen, Note, Unmarried with Privileges? Extending the Evidentiary
Privilege to Same-Sex Couples, 17 REV. LITIG. 311, 341 (1998).
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available to same-sex spouses today,18 there exists a strange twilight
zone for the couples like Pat and Chris in this Note’s opening fan-
tasia. Because the confidential marital communications privilege
applies only to couples who were legally married at the time of the
communication,19 same-sex couples who were barred from marrying
in their home states can be compelled to share pre-Obergefell mar-
ital secrets on the stand.20 The confidential marital communications
privilege is of particular concern as it protects the communications
between spouses regardless of their marital state at the time of
trial.21 The spousal testimonial privilege, on the other hand, re-
quires that the spouses be married at the time of trial.22 Although
it may be fair to insist that post-Obergefell couples actually obtain
marriage licenses in order to invoke the spousal testimonial priv-
ilege, no remedy currently exists for same-sex couples to avoid the
inequities forced upon them by being forced to disclose confidential
marital communications.
This Note argues that the promise of liberty enshrined in
Obergefell requires a modification of the confidential marital com-
munications privilege vis-à-vis those couples unfairly prejudiced by
now-unconstitutional laws. This Note presents this argument in
four parts.
Part I provides general background necessary for understanding
the following Parts. It first presents a brief synopsis of the battle for
same-sex marriages from the first attempt to have a state recognize
a gay marriage in the 1970s up to the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Obergefell v. Hodges. It then presents an overview of the two marital
privileges before going into greater detail of the confidential marital
communication privilege and its unique nature among the broader
evidentiary privileges.
Part II analyzes the language of Obergefell to determine wheth-
er the Court intended for the rights of marriage to be applied
18. See infra Part II.
19. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 301 (2015).
20. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (discussion of the case of Bobbie Jo
Clary).
21. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 301 (2015).
22. Id.
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retroactively to same-sex marriages.23 The alternative—that the
decision only prospectively allows same-sex couples to get marriage
licenses—would preclude the rest of this Note’s argument. Happily,
not only does the analysis in this Part demonstrate that the Court
intended for retroactive recognition of same-sex marriages, but the
examples in the following Parts bolster the analysis.
Part III presents one way in which same-sex marriages can
achieve retroactive recognition: through common-law marriage.
After providing a brief background of common-law marriage
doctrine, this Part presents, for the first time in the scholarly
literature, several examples of this method of retroactive recognition
achieving success in Texas and Pennsylvania.
Part IV provides an argument for the retroactive recognition of
same-sex marriages in states that do not recognize common-law
marriage. This Part focuses on the traditional rationales for changes
in evidentiary privileges in the federal courts. It argues that public
policy and issues of equity mandate the recognition of the confiden-
tial marital communications privilege for couples that would have
been married but for unconstitutional state limitations on marriage.
Building on the elements of common-law marriage, this Part con-
cludes by presenting elements of a test that the courts can apply in
deciding whether to expand the privilege in any given case. The end
result of the analysis presented in this Note is a method for the
future application of the retroactivity of same-sex marriages beyond
the scope of the marital communications privilege.
23. This Note does not, however, take the position that Obergefell should retroactively
apply the spousal privilege to opposite-sex couples that had been engaged to be married or
considered themselves married without legal recognition. Such couples had the capacity to
legally marry and suffered no governmental prejudice; same-sex couples were prejudicially
denied that capacity.
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I. BACKGROUND: SAME-SEX MARRIAGES AND THE SPOUSAL
PRIVILEGES
A. Same-Sex Marriages
Two people of the same sex have been entering into marriage-like
relationships throughout history.24 Beginning in the 1960s, the
Metropolitan Community Church began performing religious
marriages of same-sex couples—performing an estimated 85,000 by
the early twenty-first century.25 Whether informal arrangements or
religiously sanctified unions, the marriages had no legal status.26
This lack of legal status rubbed many the wrong way—not only
for reasons of “dignity,”27 but also for the lack of the many rights,
benefits, and privileges that came with legal recognition of mar-
riage.28 Many same-sex couples instead turned to contractual
arrangements to gain some of the property,29 hospital visitation,30
and parenting rights31 of legally recognized marriages.
The fight for governmental recognition of same-sex marriages
dates back to the 1970s when the first gay couple attempted to
marry in the state of Minnesota.32 That attempt—and many others
24. See generally JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE (1994)
(focusing specifically on the acceptance of same-sex unions in early Christianity); LOUIS
CROMPTON, HOMOSEXUALITY AND CIVILIZATION (2003) (identifying celebrated same-sex rela-
tionships in European and Asian history from Ancient Greece to the seventeenth century). For
specific examples of more modern American same-sex “marriages,” see generally RODGER
STREITMATTER, OUTLAW MARRIAGES: THE HIDDEN HISTORIES OF FIFTEEN EXTRAORDINARY
SAME-SEX COUPLES (2012).
25. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 22 (2013).
26. See generally LILLIAN FADERMAN, THE GAY REVOLUTION: THE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE
(2015).
27. Dignity is, according to some, “what LGBT persons seem to want most.” Dwyer, supra
note 11, at 7.
28. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
29. See Bonauto et al., supra note 12, at 1.
30. See Hospital Rights, supra note 12.
31. See Davis v. Kania, 836 A.2d 480, 481, 484 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2003) (enjoining a former
member of a same-sex relationship from contesting his parental status after signing a contract
establishing himself as a co-parent with the other half of the former same-sex relationship).
32. See Gay Marriage Timeline, PROCON.ORG, http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.time
line.php?timelineID=000030 [https://perma.cc/PJ6A-Z6FV] (last updated Oct. 6, 2014, 10:27
AM).
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thereafter—failed miserably.33 In 1993 Hawaii nearly legalized
same-sex marriage,34 prompting Congress to pass the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA).35 DOMA was passed to ensure that the
federal government would never have to recognize a same-sex
marriage.36
In 1999 some states began recognizing marriage-like statuses for
same-sex couples under the titles of domestic partnerships and civil
unions.37 The marital evidentiary privileges did not necessarily
attach to those legal constructs. Although they were discussed in
early drafts of California’s domestic partnership laws,38 no mention
appears in the final bill as chaptered.39 Domestic partnership laws
in Hawaii, Maine, and New Jersey were silent as to the evidentiary
privileges.40 Vermont alone specifically extended the marital
privileges to civil unions,41 but even there, the privileges did not
necessarily follow.
In 2013 Kentucky brought murder charges against Bobbie Jo
Clary and sought to have her same-sex spouse, Geneva Case, testify
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. The Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012) (invalidated by Obergefell and
Windsor). For background of the bill and reaction at the time, see David W. Dunlap,
Congressional Bills Withhold Sanction of Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 1996), http://
www.nytimes.com/1996/05/09/us/congressional-bills-withhold-sanction-of-same-sex-unions.
html [https://perma.cc/7KS7-NH4E].
36. See Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is Un-
constitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1997).
37. Domestic partnerships were made available in California, beginning September 22,
1999; Washington state, beginning July 22, 2007; Oregon, beginning January 1, 2008; and
Maryland, beginning July 1, 2008. See Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/humanservices/civilunionsanddomestic
partnershipstatutes.aspx [https://perma.cc/2DGP-XBVU] (last updated Nov. 18, 2014). Civil
unions were made available in Vermont on July 1, 2000; in Connecticut on October 1, 2005;
in New Hampshire on February 1, 2008; and in Illinois, Hawaii, Delaware, and Rhode Island
in 2011. See id.
38. See Assemb. B. 205, 2003-2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(b)(8)(A) (Cal. as introduced Jan.
28, 2003), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_0201-0250/ab_205_bill_20030128_
introduced.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJ46-ZR5Q].
39. See Assemb. B. 205, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. as chaptered 2003), http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/asm/ab_0201-0250/ab_205_bill_20030922_chaptered.pdf. [https://
perma.cc/GP7G-P7WR].
40. See Penfil, supra note 17, at 835.
41. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(15) (2015).
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against her.42 Before moving to Kentucky, Ms. Case and Ms. Clary
lived in Vermont and entered into a civil union under Vermont
law.43 Regardless of the Vermont legislature’s intent to extend the
privileges to Ms. Case and Ms. Clary,44 the Kentucky court refused
to do the same:
At a minimum, the privilege granted by the Commonwealth of
Kentucky would require that the parties be actually married.
Ms. Case and [Ms. Clary] are not, under the law of either
Kentucky or Vermont. The fact that Vermont may extend the
marital privilege to couples who have entered into a civil union
does not require Kentucky to do so.45
The Kentucky court’s distinction between marriage and civil
union speaks to a larger understanding of their unequal footing.
With civil unions receiving neither the legal nor social recognition
of marriages, many same-sex couples opted to forego civil unions.46
In 2004 Massachusetts became the first state to give full recogni-
tion to same-sex marriages,47 and over the next eleven years many
states followed Massachusetts’s lead.48 Many of the state court cases
that mandated recognition of same-sex unions specifically brought
attention to the question of the spousal privileges.49 As a result of
42. Commonwealth v. Clary, No. 11-CR-3329, at 1 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013) (order
denying the invocation of marital privilege).
43. See id.
44. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(15).
45. Clary, No. 11-CR-3329, at 6 (emphasis added).
46. See GARY J. GATES ET AL., WILLIAMS INST., MARRIAGE, REGISTRATION AND DISSOLUTION
BY SAME-SEX COUPLES IN THE U.S. 2 (2008), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/research/
marriage-and-couples-rights/marriage-registration-and-dissolution-by-same-sex-couples-in-
the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/K6JJ-PLUW] (noting the disparity in rates of adoption of marriage
and civil unions and attributing that gap to a “lack of enthusiasm for non-marital forms of
recognition”).
47. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003).
48. See History and Timeline of the Freedom to Marry in the United States, FREEDOM TO
MARRY (June 26, 2015), https://perma.cc/5V6Y-9A8L.
49. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 902 n.28 (Iowa 2009) (identifying
“restriction of testimony of communication between husband and wife” as one of the more
than 200 Iowa statutes affected by marital status); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 956 (“Exclusive
marital benefits that are not directly tied to property rights include ... evidentiary rights, such
as the prohibition against spouses testifying against one another about their private
conversations.”); Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 215 (N.J. 2006) (“Among the rights afforded
to married couples but denied to committed same-sex couples [is] the right to ... the
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these changes in state policy, the courts in those states were man-
dated to give same-sex couples the same evidentiary privileges as
opposite-sex couples.50
In 2013 the Supreme Court struck down the DOMA provision
that prevented the federal government from recognizing same-sex
marriages legally contracted in the states.51 In response, Attorney
General Eric Holder directed all U.S. Department of Justice lawyers
to recognize the marital privileges of same-sex couples and to not
object if those privileges were raised.52 Holder’s policy went beyond
the basic requirements of Windsor and ordered recognition of the
marital privilege of same-sex couples even if the marriage was not
recognized as legal in the forum state.53 The order stood in sharp
contrast to the requirement that state law govern privileges.54
However, Holder’s guidance contained a very large loophole: it
explicitly applied only to individuals in valid marriages and not to
“similar relationship[s], such as a domestic partnership or civil
union, recognized under state law that is not denominated as a
marriage under the laws of that state.”55
Two years later in Obergefell, the Court ruled that “same-sex
couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.”56 Despite
localized acts of defiance by county clerks,57 same-sex couples can
marry in any U.S. jurisdiction and same-sex spouses will be able to
invoke the spousal testimonial privilege in any proceedings where
testimonial privilege.” (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17(2) (West 2016))).
50. See Bergstrom & Denvil, supra note 17, at 226-27.
51. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“[DOMA] is invalid, for no
legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom
the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”).
52. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., to All Department Employees, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Department Policy on Ensuring Equal Treatment for Same-Sex Married
Couples 3 (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/ss-married-couples-ag-
memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/84KG-HYCU].
53. Id. at 4.
54. FED. R. EVID. 501.
55. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., supra note 52, at 1 n.1; see also Mike Dorf,
What Is the Theory Behind the Latest Holder Memo on SSM—And Does It Go Far Enough?,
DORF ON L. (Feb. 11, 2014), http:// www.dorfonlaw.org/2014/02/what-is-theory-behind-latest-
holder.html [https://perma.cc/93TX-CSCV].
56. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
57. Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Kentucky Clerk Denies Same-Sex Marriage
Licenses, Defying Court, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/02/us/
same-sex-marriage-kentucky-kim-davis.html [https://perma.cc/27FC-3AJE].
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applicable.58 In other words, same-sex marriages are on the same
footing as opposite-sex marriages when it comes to the spousal
testimonial privilege.
The relationship of same-sex couples in regards to the confiden-
tial marital communications privilege, however, is different.
B. The Confidential Marital Communications Privilege
An evidentiary privilege has long been attached to the relation-
ship between husband and wife.59 The ancient privilege developed
from the notion that a woman had no legal identity separate from
her husband, and thus she was incompetent to stand witness
against him in any proceeding.60 With the expansion of the recogni-
tion of women’s personhood, the original privilege expanded to keep
either spouse from testifying.61 The expansiveness of that privilege
caused many to question its usefulness and resulted in the creation
of a separate privilege attached solely to confidential communica-
tions made between two spouses.62 Those privileges are now viewed
as separate sub-privileges under the aegis of the spousal privileges:
the spousal testimonial privilege bars spouses from adversely
testifying at all against one another, and the confidential marital
communications privilege bars the admission into evidence of
statements made between two spouses.63 Every U.S. jurisdiction
recognizes one or both of the two spousal privileges.64
58. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2606.
59. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43-44 (1980) (citing 1 E. COKE, A COM-
MENTARIE UPON LITTLETON 6b (1628)). Much like other privileges, the spousal privilege has
been controversial. For an old argument that the spousal privilege needlessly hampers justice,
see 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 338 (Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827).
For a modern attack on the marital privileges, see generally David Medine, The Adverse
Testimony Privilege: Time to Dispose of a “Sentimental Relic,” 67 OR. L. REV. 519 (1988).
Arguments for and against the marital privileges, in general, play an important role in the
analysis of Part IV, infra.
60. See Bergstrom & Denvil, supra note 17, at 230.
61. See id.
62. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 44-45.
63. See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 301 (2015).
64. See Bergstrom & Denvil, supra note 17, at 225. Federal law since Trammel has
recognized only the marital communications privilege, and not the spousal testimonial
privilege. See Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53. However, Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 505
included only the spousal testimonial privilege, and even then only included the privilege in
criminal proceedings. See Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, 56 F.R.D. 183, 244-45 (1972); see also
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The confidential marital communications privilege renders in-
admissible the contents of a (1) confidential (2) communication (3)
between two spouses.65 Both spouses hold the privilege vis-à-vis any
communication made during the course of their marriage.66 Just like
any other privilege, the confidential marital communications
privilege is narrowly construed “to the very limited extent that ...
excluding relevant evidence has a public good transcending the
normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for
ascertaining truth.”67 In most jurisdictions, however, confiden-
tiality is a rebuttable presumption for any communication between
spouses.68 In those cases, the burden of proving that the privilege
does not apply rests with the party seeking to introduce the
privileged information.69 Importantly, the confidential marital com-
munications privilege also applies to couples that are no longer
married, as long as the communication in question occurred during
marriage.70
Federal courts recognize the confidential marital communications
privilege.71 The confidential marital communications privilege is
also recognized in criminal and civil proceedings in the District of
Columbia and all fifty states except for Arkansas, where the
privilege applies solely to criminal proceedings.72
For the purposes of this Note, it is critically important that the
privilege requires “spouses,” meaning the two parties must be
married at the time the communication was made.73 In most cases
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal Courts: An Alternative to the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 GEO. L.J. 61, 67-68 (1973) (describing how “the
husband and wife privilege has pretty generally been eliminated” in Proposed Rule 505).
65. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 309 (2015).
66. Id. § 306; see also, e.g., Merlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 90, 91 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (“[T]he privilege may be invoked by either party.”).
67. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
68. See Merlin, 180 F. Supp. at 91 (“Confidence and privacy are presumed to have been
intended in conversations held between husband and wife.”).
69. 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 309 (2015).
70. See Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954) (“[D]ivorce ... does not terminate the
privilege for confidential marital communications.”); Medine, supra note 59, at 521 (“The
[confidential marital communications] privilege survives the marriage.”).
71. See United States v. Hamilton, 778 F. Supp. 2d 651, 654-55 (E.D. Va. 2011).
72. See Bergstrom & Denvil, supra note 17, at 225 n.4. Arkansas alone limits the con-
fidential communications privilege to criminal proceedings. ARK. R. EVID. 504(b).
73. Steven N. Gofman, Note, “Honey, the Judge Says We’re History”: Abrogating the
Marital Privileges via Modern Doctrines of Marital Worthiness, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 843, 848
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this is a simple question of governmental licensure,74 but in cases in
which the marriage is by common law, the party invoking the priv-
ilege must prove the existence of the marriage by a preponderance
of the evidence.75 No U.S. court has recognized an evidentiary priv-
ilege between two unmarried people regardless of the nature of their
relationship.76
Now that same-sex couples can legally marry in all U.S. jurisdic-
tions, those couples can rest assured that their communications
made after Obergefell will be privileged throughout the United
States. However, because the confidential marital communications
privilege requires that the couple be married when the communica-
tion was made, those couples who were not allowed to marry before
Obergefell cannot invoke the privilege for communications made be-
fore Obergefell regardless of their current marital state under the
current understanding of the privilege. The precedent in Obergefell,
and in regard to privileges, mandates a change in this understand-
ing.
In calling into question the validity of the litigation strategy em-
braced by the gay rights movement, Professor James Dwyer made
the case that marriage is no longer a fundamental right.77 The
cornerstone of Professor Dwyer’s argument is that marriage was a
fundamental right when it protected its participants from anti-for-
nication laws, among other criminal penalties, such that denying a
couple a marriage license would leave them in jeopardy.78 Because
(1992). The Seventh Circuit, however, has found that communications made where a marriage
exists under law but where the spouses have permanently separated do not merit the pro-
tections of the marital communications privilege. See United States v. Byrd, 750 F.2d 585, 593
(7th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he fact of separation at the time of the communications rebuts the pre-
sumption of confidentiality that is a requirement of the exercise of the privilege.”).
74. Sanford Levinson, Testimonial Privileges and the Preferences of Friendship, 1984
DUKE L.J. 631, 648 (noting that the marital privilege is easy to apply because of the “rela-
tively unambiguous legal tests” to identify those to whom the privileges apply).
75. See Mesa v. United States, 875 A.2d 79, 82 (D.C. 2005).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Neeley, 475 F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (4th Cir. 1973) (declining
to apply the privilege when the defendant had not divorced his previous wife and thus was in
an invalid, bigamous marriage with the testifying putative spouse); United States v.
Boatwright, 446 F.2d 913, 915 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating there is no privilege where common-law
marriage is not proven).
77. Dwyer, supra note 11, at 8.
78. Id. at 11 (“Denying a marriage license to a couple was therefore in the past an in-
fringement of a negative liberty, a right to the freedom to fulfill basic human needs and
desires.”).
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sexual intimacy is a basic human need, denying someone the
opportunity to marry—and thus have sex without criminal
penalty—would be in violation of his or her negative right.79 That
negative right has been recognized beyond the marital relationship
through the expansion of privacy rights, and therefore marriage
itself is no longer a necessary prerequisite to have one’s privacy
rights respected.80 The other benefits provided by the state to
married couples, Dwyer argues, amount to the sort of gratuitous
benefits that can never rise to the level of a fundamental consti-
tutional right.81
What Professor Dwyer misses is the unique position of the
spousal evidentiary privileges.82 Although it is true that the priv-
ileges do not derive directly from the Constitution,83 in form they
amount to a negative right—the right to maintain privacy in one’s
most intimate relationship.84 This is vastly different from the gra-
tuitous benefits that Dwyer writes about.85 Couples exercising the
privilege do not get anything—they are instead being left free from
government intervention, much like the decision in Griswold left
Connecticut couples free from government intervention in their sex
lives.86
The confidential marital communications privilege, in particular,
is an important and unique benefit of marriage. After Obergefell,
79. Id.
80. Id. at 11-14.
81. Id. at 17-18.
82. See United States v. Morris, 988 F.2d 1335, 1339 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he marital
privilege is one that remains vital in modern jurisprudence and has been sanctioned by
Congress and the Supreme Court.”).
83. See id. at 1338 (“The marital privilege is conferred upon witnesses by the Congress
and not by the Constitution.”); cf. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Dangerous Trend Blurring the
Distinction Between a Reasonable Expectation of Confidentiality in Privilege Law and a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 57 LOY. L. REV. 1,
17 (2011) (noting the differences between constitutional rights to privacy and the evidentiary
privilege’s recognition of special relationships).
84. See Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV.
147, 168-69 (2015) (“[M]arriage is a negative right in that it creates a zone of privacy into
which the state cannot intrude, as we see ... in the testimonial privileges that permit spouses
to refuse to testify against each other.”).
85. See Levinson, supra note 74, at 636 n.16 (referring to testimonial privileges not as an
option, but as “entitlements” held by individuals to refuse to testify). By recognizing that the
privileges are, in fact, “entitlements,” Professor Levinson hints at the notion that the
privileges are indeed rights rather than mere options. See id.
86. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
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same-sex couples that had been previously unable to legally marry
were suddenly able to do so. For the purposes of the spousal
testimonial privilege, those same-sex couples were on the exact
same footing as any opposite-sex couple that had yet to marry:
though at that time they would not be able to invoke the privilege
where available, that deficiency is easily remedied by marriage. As
far as the confidential marital communications privilege was
concerned, however, same-sex couples were not put on exactly the
same footing. Yes, once they marry, a same-sex couple will be able
to exercise the privilege over any future communications, just like
a straight couple; but unlike straight couples, if a previous commu-
nication from a same-sex couple were to be brought up in court, they
would not have previously had any recourse to make their commu-
nications privileged.
II. THE RETROACTIVITY OF OBERGEFELL
This Note is not the first entry in the literature of expanding the
marital privileges,87 even in the realm of same-sex unions.88 That
literature constitutes a compelling body of argument for a same-sex
marital privilege in the absence of a national ruling on marriage
equality. Although the arguments in those works remain compel-
ling, Obergefell has rendered them largely moot. This Note builds on
the earlier work of those scholars in identifying the importance of
the marital privileges for same-sex couples, but goes beyond their
scope by exploring how that privilege must be construed now that
same-sex marriage is a reality. Given the Obergefell decision, the
analysis must turn to whether that decision prospectively gives
same-sex couples the option to marry or if it declares that the
marital rights of same-sex couples must be recognized by the
government. Under both logical analyses of the decision and ap-
plication of the Court’s precedents, the answer to that question is
that Obergefell gives access to marital rights, not just the marital
rite.
Although the case obviously stands for the proposition that laws
retaining exclusive marriage rights for opposite-sex couples are
87. See, e.g., Levinson, supra note 74, at 648.
88. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutional,89 and regardless of debates about the quality of the
Court’s reasoning,90 the exact scope of the holding calls for scrutiny.
Did Obergefell give same-sex couples the right to wed, or did it give
same-sex couples the right to marriage and the benefits thereof? In
most circumstances, this is a distinction without a difference: one
naturally follows the other. But in circumstances where a marriage
existed in fact, but not in law due to unconstitutional state proscrip-
tions, the meaning is slightly less clear. If Obergefell gave nothing
more than the right to wed, a same-sex couple in that situation
would essentially have to re-marry. If, however, Obergefell gives
same-sex couples the right to marriage, then denying them all of the
privileges of marriage in the present-tense would be unconstitu-
tional.
Although the bulk of the decision speaks specifically to “the right
to marry,”91 terminology which most likely tips towards the right to
obtain a marriage license, the greater proposition supported by the
holding is that same-sex couples’ marriages are constitutionally
mandated to be at the same level as opposite-sex couples. Indeed,
the narrowest holding of the majority is that “the State laws
challenged by Petitioners in these cases are now held invalid to the
extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the
same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples.”92 In favor of the
notion that Obergefell calls for the expansion of marital rights,
Justice Kennedy specifically called attention to the “significant
material costs” same-sex couples faced without the benefits of
marriage.93
The true aim of Obergefell is to level the playing field and ensure
the equal treatment of same-sex and opposite-sex couples.94 Indeed,
89. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
90. See id. at 2611, 2616-18 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (referring to “the majority’s decision
[as] an act of will, not legal judgment” and likening it to the now-ridiculed Lochner and Dred
Scott decisions); Clare Huntington, Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84
FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 23 (2015) (expressing discontent with the Court’s reasoning for not going
far enough in supporting same-sex couples).
91. The phrase “right to marry” appears thirty-one times in the majority opinion. See
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 passim.
92. Id. at 2605.
93. Id. at 2590.
94. See id. at 2604 (“It is now clear that the challenged laws [that limit marriage to
opposite-sex couples] burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and it must be further
acknowledged that they abridge central precepts of equality.”); Serena Mayeri, Marriage
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the opinion goes so far to say that “the Equal Protection Clause can
help to identify and correct inequalities in the institution of mar-
riage,”95 suggesting that deficiencies in equality can, and should,
be ameliorated. In fact, some scholars have noted that Obergefell’s
lack of a classification of heightened scrutiny limits the decision’s
holding to marriage.96 If Obergefell was calculated to focus solely on
the marriage question, the importance of an equitable expansion of
the spousal evidentiary privileges is even more appropriate. Indeed,
Justice Kennedy specifically understood that the issue is not obtain-
ing a license, but rather same-sex couples’ “need [ ] for [marriage’s]
privileges and responsibilities.”97 Furthermore, although the opinion
paid lip-service to the Equal Protection Clause, its focus on the Due
Process Clause intimates that the right to marriage is a right to the
institution’s benefits and protections—as the Due Process Clause is
instrumental in carrying out justice rather than the broader,
person-focused Equal Protection Clause.98
What exactly does the majority mean in the statement that “laws
excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma
and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter”?99 It is a
strange construction: right is in the singular. In spoken English, a
“marriage rite” refers to a wedding ceremony.100 But the majority
explicitly writes “right,” which itself is troubling because of the
Court’s references to the multiple rights that come with marriage.101
The opinion is rather clear that the petitioners sought not just the
ability to obtain a marriage license, but to enjoy the rights of
(In)equality and the Historical Legacies of Feminism, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 126, 126 (2015)
(noting that Obergefell “vanquish[ed] the material and dignitary harms that same-sex
marriage bans visited upon individuals and families”).
95. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
96. Mayeri, supra note 94, at 131 (echoing feminist disappointment that “without a
declaration that heightened scrutiny should apply to all sexual orientation-based
classifications, it seemed possible to confine Obergefell’s analysis to marriage and leave other
injustices untouched”).
97. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594.
98. Professor Russell K. Robinson has put forth a similar argument. See Russell K.
Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154-55 (2016). Professor Robinson argues
that the Court’s eschewing of Equal Protection is a method of providing same-sex couples
more avenues for legal redress. Id.
99. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
100. See Rite, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rite [https://
perma.cc/2MKP-D89S].
101. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600, 2602.
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marriage, and thus the right to be married: “same-sex couples seek
in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and
it would disparage their choices and diminish their personhood to
deny them this right.”102 That legal treatment includes the “spousal
privilege in the law of evidence” among “the constellation of benefits
that the States have linked to marriage.”103
Although the Court does not explicitly state that same-sex couples
affected by pre-Obergefell law are entitled to retroactive applica-
tion of post-Obergefell law, it is the logical result of the ruling.104
Professor Eric Berger identified such “stealth determinations” in
Justice Kennedy’s Lawrence decision.105 In 2013 Professor Berger
noted that the clarity of Lawrence’s holding belied its complicated
implications in other areas of the law and accurately predicted its
sub-doctrinal importance to the eventual decision in Windsor, which
had just been granted certiorari.106 The same indeterminacy
Professor Berger identified in Lawrence’s “stealth determinations”
exists in spades in Obergefell, giving lower courts the flexibility to
apply it beyond the most general level.107
Although the Court does not explicitly state that same-sex couples
who were denied the opportunity to obtain civil marriages have
recourse to have some of the rights of marriage retroactively applied
to their pre-Obergefell relationships, it is the logical result of the
ruling. If the post-decision history of the Justice Kennedy-penned
decisions in Lawrence and Windsor are any guidance, it seems near-
ly a foregone conclusion that the retroactive recognition of same-sex
marriage rights will be a lasting result of the decision. In those
cases, although the majority limited their rulings to the question of
the criminalization of same-sex sodomy and the federal recognition
of state-sanctioned marriages, and explicitly stayed clear of the
102. Id. at 2602.
103. Id. at 2601.
104. See generally Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Mar-
riage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765 (2013).
105. Id. at 767.
106. See id. at 787-89; see also, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2676 (2013).
107. Berger, supra note 104, at 767-68.
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larger question of the rights of same-sex couples,108 lower courts
readily extracted larger lessons about LGBT rights.109 
Since the Court’s decision a handful of cases have applied its
ruling. The Court of Appeals of South Carolina recently remanded
to family court a case involving child support payments between two
women who had previously been in a relationship.110 The one-page
order instructed the family court to consider the implications of
Obergefell on its May 5, 2014, dismissal under the authority of
South Carolina’s then-in-force same-sex marriage ban, clearly im-
plying the earlier decision should be modified retroactively.111 The
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York disagrees.112
In a probate case, that court stated Obergefell did “not compel a
retroactive declaration that the ‘Commitment Ceremony’ entered
into by decedent and [his putative husband] in 2002 ... was a legally
valid marriage.”113 The court also noted the couple had an “under-
standing that they had never been legally married,”114 suggesting
that instead of denying the retroactivity of Obergefell in all cases the
court was simply tailoring the decision to the facts at hand against
the petitioner. Some courts have even directly dodged the retroac-
tivity question when it was raised.115 There is one area of marriage
law that has, however, embraced the retroactivity of Obergefell
without hesitation: common law marriage.
108. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (confining the holding and opinion “to those lawful mar-
riages” conducted under state law but unrecognized under DOMA); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“[This case] does not involve whether the government must give formal
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”).
109. See, e.g., Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 659, 670 (7th Cir. 2014) (striking down an
Indiana statute and a Wisconsin constitutional amendment limiting marriage to opposite-sex
couples; noting that the arguments against DOMA in Windsor “apply with even greater force
to Indiana’s law” and that Lawrence may “rule[ ] out moral objections to homosexuality as
legitimate grounds for discrimination”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); Bostic v. Schaefer,
760 F.3d 352, 374 (4th Cir. 2014) (striking down Virginia’s constitutional amendment banning
gay marriage and noting that Lawrence and Windsor “firmly position same-sex relationships
within the ambit of the Due Process Clauses’ protection”), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014).
110. Swicegood v. Thompson, No. 2016-UP-013, 2016 WL 192045 (S.C. Ct. App. Jan. 13,
2016).
111. Id.
112. See In re Estate of Leyton, 22 N.Y.S.3d 422, 423 (App. Div. 2016).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See MacDougall v. Levick, 782 S.E.2d 182, 194 n.12 (Va. Ct. App. 2016) (explicitly
rejecting the opportunity to determine if Virginia must “retroactively ratify same-sex
marriages that were entered into prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell”).
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III. RETROACTIVITY THROUGH COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE
Common-law marriages are “marriages without formal solemni-
zation or ... formalities.”116 Although once available in more states,
today common-law marriages can be contracted in only twelve juris-
dictions.117 A few states that have abolished common-law marriage
still recognize marriages contracted before the abolition.118 Beyond
this small group, only a handful of other states119 and the federal
system120 recognize the validity of a common-law marriage con-
tracted in one of those states.121
In general, a common-law marriage requires an “actual and
mutual agreement” between two people capable of being married122
and that the couple live together or openly assume normal “marital
duties and obligations.”123 Common-law marriages need not be
116. See 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 10 (2015). Some make a point of distinguishing “common-law
marriages” from “informal marriages”—the latter referring to marriages in states where
requirements are spelled out in a statute, and the former referring to those that are based
solely in the common law. See Kathryn S. Vaughn, Comment, The Recent Changes to the Texas
Informal Marriage Statute: Limitation or Abolition of Common-Law Marriage?, 28 HOUS. L.
REV. 1131, 1150, 1152 (1991) (noting that by passing an informal marriage statute the Texas
legislature “effectively abolished common-law marriage” in that state). This Note will use the
term “common-law marriage” throughout.
117. They are Alabama, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah. SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM, GN 00305.075, STATE LAWS ON VALIDITY OF COMMON-
LAW (NON-CEREMONIAL MARRIAGES) (2013), http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200305075
[https://perma.cc/243B-ZXF8].
118. Pennsylvania, for example, recognizes common-law marriages contracted in the state
on or before January 1, 2005. Id.
119. Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota,
Washington, and Wyoming (ten states in total) recognize common-law marriages validly con-
tracted in other states. Id.
120. See, e.g., In re Frawley, 112 B.R. 32, 33 (D. Colo. 1990) (acknowledging that a common-
law marriage would count as a valid marriage for purposes of federal tax law).
121. It remains to be seen if the Court’s ruling on the second question in Obergefell—
whether “the Constitution requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed
out of State”—may in fact mean that states are constitutionally required to recognize com-
mon-law marriages contracted in other states. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607
(2015).
122. See 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 10 (2015).
123. Id.
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solemnized, but evidence of a ceremony can prove one of the
elements.124
Interesting things happen when same-sex marriage and common-
law marriage are put next to one another. On the one hand, as
same-sex marriages came to be recognized in more states at least
one court expected disenchanted heterosexuals to turn to common-
law marriage “because they no longer wish to be associated with the
civil institution as redefined.”125 On the other hand, common-law
marriage could be a refuge for same-sex couples that seek the
benefits of marriage without having to register their relationship
with a less-than-supportive state government.126 The most interest-
ing possible interaction between same-sex marriage and common
law marriage is one that has not actually been discussed in the
academic literature or in any published opinions. The cases explored
in the following subparts demonstrate how two states’ treatment
of common-law marriage have redeemed same-sex unions that
suffered from a lack of recognition at the time of their original
contracting.
A. Pennsylvania
In December 2014, Sabrina Maurer petitioned the Orphans’
Court of Bucks County, Pennsylvania, for a declaration of common-
law marriage between her and her spouse, who had died earlier
that year.127 In theory, it was simple enough. Although Pennsyl-
vania had long recognized common-law marriages,128 the legislature
passed a bill in 2004 prospectively proscribing common-law mar-
riages beginning January 1, 2005.129 However, a couple could
124. Id.
125. Sevcik v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1016 (D. Nev. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Latta v.
Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014).
126. See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Essay, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV.
931 (2011).
127. See Verified Declaratory Judgment Complaint and Amended Petition for Declaration
of Common Law Marriage, Maurer v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. 2014-E0681-29 (C.P.
Bucks Cty., Pa., Orphans’ Ct. Dec. 29, 2014) [hereinafter Declaratory Judgment].
128. See Ryan P. Newell, Comment, “To Be Sure He Is My Husband Good Enough,” or Is
He? An Analysis of Common Law Marriage in Pennsylvania, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 337, 341-
48 (2004) (chronicling the case history of common-law marriage in Pennsylvania from 1814
to present day).
129. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (2004).
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effectively contract a common-law marriage prior to that date by
exchanging vows, living together, and maintaining a reputation as
being married.130 Thus, although Pennsylvania no longer allowed
new common-law marriages to be contracted, Maurer could have her
relationship—which fit all of those requirements—recognized as a
common-law marriage if those criteria had been met before 2005.131
According to judicial precedent setting out the requirements to con-
tract a common-law marriage, “a common law marriage can only be
created by the exchange of words in the present tense [‘verba in
praesenti’], spoken with the specific purpose that the legal relation-
ship of husband and wife is created by that.”132
All in all, everything seemed to be in place. Since a 2001 cere-
mony,133 Ms. Maurer and her spouse had considered themselves
married and held themselves out to family and friends as a married
couple.134 They had lived together in Pennsylvania from 2002 until
Ms. Maurer’s spouse’s death in 2013.135
What made this petition for recognition unusual was that both
Ms. Maurer and her spouse, Kim Underwood, were women.136
Pennsylvania did not recognize same-sex marriage until ordered to
do so by the federal courts.137 Although the motion was filed after
the Federal District Court invalidated Pennsylvania’s marriage
laws, it was filed before the decision was rendered in Obergefell.138
It was only after filing a Notice of Supplemental Authority,
130. See Sullivan v. Am. Bridge Co., 176 A. 24, 25-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935) (citing Travers
v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423 (1907)) (adopting the then-federal standard for a finding of a
common-law marriage as the law in Pennsylvania).
131. See Declaratory Judgment, supra note 127, at para. 10.
132. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Stamos), 831 A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2003) (quoting Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 714 A.2d 1016, 1020 (Pa. 1998))
(addition in brackets and emphasis in original).
133. Although they serve as an opportunity for the exchange of verbae de preasenti,
ceremonies are unnecessary to a marriage in Pennsylvania. See Sullivan, 176 A. at 25
(“[C]ommon-law marriages, without any ceremony, are valid in New Jersey and
Pennsylvania.”).
134. See Declaratory Judgment, supra note 127, at para. 4.
135. See id. at para. 15.
136. See id. at para. 14.
137. See Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (holding that
Pennsylvania’s laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violate both the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses).
138. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Declaratory Judgment, supra note
127.
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including the Obergefell decision, that the court finally granted an
order recognizing Ms. Maurer and Ms. Underwood’s marriage.139
Ms. Maurer’s case has been cited as the first example of common-
law marriage being applied to a same-sex couple.140 How that court-
ordered recognition affects Ms. Maurer’s life is a different question:
Ms. Maurer’s petition sought only recognition without seeking any
relief from, among others, the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue
for a refund of estate taxes or the life insurance company that
denied Ms. Maurer benefits upon the death of Ms. Underwood.141 In
fact, Ms. Maurer’s petition was entirely uncontested by an adverse
party.142
B. Texas
Meanwhile, in Texas—a state with far more conservative ten-
dencies than Pennsylvania—gay couples have been called upon to
get “no-nup” agreements to foreclose the possibility of nasty divorce
proceedings after a break-up.143 Although Ms. Maurer was able to
have her petition fly through the courts without intervention, even
by parties she invited, a similar case saw the Attorney General of
Texas actively seek to intervene.144
In June 2014 Stella Powell passed away without leaving a will,
and her surviving blood relatives filed a motion to have themselves
declared Ms. Powell’s only heirs.145 One person was conspicuously
139. See Notice of Supplemental Authority, Maurer v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No.
2014-E0681-29 (C.P. Bucks Cty., Pa., Orphans’ Ct. June 30, 2014).
140. Maryclaire Dale, Judge Deems Gay Couple as Spouses After 1 Partner’s Death, AP
(July 31, 2015, 5:29 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/7bbc532eb76d4539bfde58d54c2b088a/
judge-deems-gay-couple-spouses-after-1-partners-death [https://perma.cc/PT6C-5QNT].
141. Motion to Grant Relief Requested in Petition or to Schedule a Hearing, Maurer v.
United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., No. 2014-E0681-29 (C.P. Bucks Cty., Pa., Orphans’ Ct. May
20, 2015).
142. See id. at Exhibit K. The Pennsylvania Department of Revenue specifically stated that
it did not intend to enter an appearance in the matter. Id.
143. See Christina Pesoli, Gay and Cohabitating in Texas?: You Just Might Need a No-
Nup., 78 TEX. B.J. 902, 902 (2015).
144. Mark Joseph Stern, Texas’ Law-Breaking Attorney General Is Denying Gay People
Equal Rights—Again, SLATE: OUTWARD (Sept. 11, 2015, 3:36 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
outward/2015/09/11/ken_paxton_texas_attorney_general_discriminates_against_gay_widows.
html [https://perma.cc/NR67-TFDY].
145. See Sonemaly Phrasavath’s Response to Special Exceptions and Motion to Dismiss and
Motion for Continuance at 3, In re Estate of Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Prob. Ct. Travis
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absent from the declaration of heirship: Ms. Powell’s same-sex
spouse, Sonemaly Phrasavath.146 Ms. Powell and Ms. Phrasavath
had lived together for eight years, celebrated their union in front of
family and friends at a religious ceremony, and held themselves out
to the community as a married couple.147 In seeking to have her
heirship recognized by the state, Ms. Phrasavath argued based on
the precedent in United States v. Windsor and DeLeon v. Perry that
the state’s ban on same-sex marriage should be overturned and that
her relationship with Ms. Powell should be recognized as a common-
law marriage under Texas statute.148 To say that the administration
in Austin balked at such a notion is an understatement: in a motion
filed in early 2015, the Attorney General of Texas sought to
intervene in the case in order to defend the validity of the then-
enforced ban on same-sex marriages.149 The Attorney General’s
office then went on to argue that the courts lacked the authority to
validate a “purported” marriage that was invalid for its entire
length.150 Even citing to Chevron deference, the state argued that
retroactive recognition of such marriages should not be allowed in
light of “the hardship involved with altering distributions under
state law.”151 The Travis County Probate Court overruled the state’s
objections and ordered that Sonemaly Phrasavath be recognized as
Stella Powell’s common-law spouse and receive her fair share of Ms.
Powell’s estate.152
These cases illustrate the simplest way for same-sex couples to
invoke the marital privilege to cover communications made before
they could legally marry. In those states where common-law mar-
riages can still be contracted, couples’ counsel need only establish
that they were married under common law. As seen in Part I, the
Cty., Tex. Nov. 6, 2014).
146. See id.
147. See id. at 1.
148. See id. at 6-13; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); DeLeon v.
Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632 (W.D. Tex. 2014) (finding Texas’s ban on same-sex marriage
unconstitutional), aff’d sub nom. DeLeon v. Abbott, 791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015).
149. See Plea in Intervention of the State of Texas at 2, In re Estate of Powell, No. C-1-PB-
14-001695 (Prob. Ct. Travis Cty., Tex. Feb. 18, 2015).
150. See Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment of the State of Texas
at 4, In re Estate of Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-001695 (Prob. Ct. Travis Cty., Tex. Aug. 25, 2015).
151. Id. at 5 n.1.
152. See Interlocutory Judgment Declaring Heirs, In re Estate of Powell, No. C-1-PB-14-
001695 (Prob. Ct. Travis Cty., Tex. Oct. 5, 2015).
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marital privileges do apply to common-law marriages even though
the party raising the privilege bears the burden of proving the
marriage.153 Furthermore, after being tested in both Texas and
Pennsylvania, the Obergefell-based arguments for retroactive recog-
nition of same-sex marriages put forward in Part II should hold
water if tested in the states that still recognize common-law mar-
riages.154
IV. RETROACTIVITY THROUGH A MODIFICATION OF THE
CONFIDENTIAL MARITAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE
Although common-law marriage is one way for same-sex mar-
riages to be recognized ex post facto for the purposes of the confiden-
tial marital communications privilege, that route is available in only
a handful of states.155 This Part proceeds through a discussion of
how the federal courts construe evidentiary privileges in general
before applying a four-part analysis to the creation of an entirely
new evidentiary privilege to address the position of unduly burden-
ed same-sex couples. Finally, this Part puts forward a multi-factor
test for the courts to apply when confronted with a question of the
retroactive recognition of same-sex marriages for the purpose of the
marital communications privilege. 
A. The Privileges in Federal Court
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 501, “[t]he common law—as
interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and
experience—governs a claim of privilege.”156 Thus, the spousal priv-
ileges are determined not by statute, but by the federal common
law.157 In fact, the courts are willing to reexamine and cautiously
change privileges.158 In the case of this Note’s proposal, the change
to the privilege would be of very limited scope.
153. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
154. See supra Part II.
155. See supra notes 117-18.
156. FED. R. EVID. 501.
157. Id.
158. United States v. Morris, 988 F.2d 1335, 1339 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that the courts
“should guard against turning the privilege into an empty promise” and “that trial practices
which undermine the privilege should be reviewed with a careful eye”).
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The question that this Note seeks to address could only arise in
a small number of cases in which a member of a same-sex relation-
ship is asked to testify as to what his or her then-partner said before
same-sex marriage was legalized in their state of residence.
Thus, the scope is limited first and foremost by the characteristics
of the people that could raise the issue. Based on the 2013 National
Health Interview Survey, the U.S. Department of Health and Hu-
man Services estimates that 96.6 percent of Americans identify as
heterosexual—leaving just 3.4 percent of the population in the pool
of those that could possibly have had a same-sex union that would
give rise to this issue.159
Time also limits the scope of this change. The nature of litiga-
tion—and the imposition of statutes of limitations—makes such
occurrences increasingly unlikely as time goes by.
Although the limited scope of the privilege’s change does not ex-
tend far enough to warrant the recognition of a new privilege, under
current privilege jurisprudence the courts would be justified in rec-
ognizing one as such. A fortiori, the following argument would merit
the lesser measure of recognizing a small change in the privilege as
it stands rather than a new privilege entirely.
B. The Courts Would Be Justified in Creating an Entirely New
Privilege
The Supreme Court established the test for recognizing a new
privilege when it recognized the psychotherapist privilege in Jaffee
v. Redmond.160 Under the Jaffee test, courts conduct a multifactor
analysis, considering whether the new privilege is: (1) supported by
federal policy; (2) supported by the policy goals of privileges in
general; (3) recognized by the states; and (4) advocated by
scholars.161
159. Brian W. Ward et al., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Sexual Orientation and
Health Among U.S. Adults: National Health Interview Survey, 2013, NAT’L HEALTH STAT.
REP., July 15, 2014, at 1, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr077.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4V9Q-LFUK].
160. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10-16 (1996); see also Penfil, supra note 17, at 828-31.
161. See Penfil, supra note 17, at 828.
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Save for one of these factors, the multifactor analysis shows that
an expansion of the confidential marital communications privilege
would be within the “light of reason.”162
First, the only factor that weighs heavily against the recognition
of a new privilege is that, strictly speaking, no state has adopted a
version of the confidential marital communications privilege that
applies retroactive recognition of the marital communications
privilege.163 However, there are analogous situations that support
the new privilege. First, by specifically including the spousal
privileges when creating civil unions, Vermont implicitly sanctioned
the idea of unmarried couples benefiting from the privilege.164
Second, the retroactive recognition of same-sex, common-law
marriages in Pennsylvania and Texas implicitly supports an ex-
pansion of the privilege.165 Although it is true that in both of those
situations surviving spouses sought to have their marriages
recognized after their spouses’ deaths,166 the same reasoning would
apply to recognize a common-law marriage between two living
same-sex spouses. In such a case, the confidential marital communi-
cations privilege would attach.167 These two instances by themselves
should be seen as supporting an expansion of the marital communi-
cations privilege.
Second, the new privilege is supported by federal policy. In rec-
ognizing the psychotherapist privilege in Jaffee, the Court specifi-
cally pointed to that privilege’s inclusion in the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence in support of the privilege’s adoption.168 Although
the Proposed Rules of Evidence did not contain a privilege the likes
of which is discussed here,169 federal policy nonetheless points
clearly to the inclusion of such a privilege. The Court’s holding in
Obergefell as discussed above is clearly in support of the recognition
of a pre-Obergefell privilege for those couples legally barred from
162. FED. R. EVID. 501.
163. See supra Part I.B.
164. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Part III.
166. See supra Parts III.A-B.
167. Assuming, of course, that all of the requirements of the privilege were satisfied. See
98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 301 (2015).
168. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1996); see also Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 504, 56
F.R.D. 183, 240-41 (1972).
169. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, 56 F.R.D. 183, 244-45 (1972).
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marriage.170 Additionally, the policies of the Obama administration
have very clearly been in favor of the expansion of rights for LGBT
people.171 In particular, the Department of Justice’s policy to rec-
ognize the spousal privilege for same-sex couples clearly points in
the same direction.172
Third, the new privilege is supported by the traditional ratio-
nales for evidentiary privileges. The goals of the development of
privileges extend to both humanistic and instrumental concerns.173
Instrumental concerns cover the effect of forcing testimony on the
relationship.174 Humanistic concerns are those fundamental con-
cerns about morality and fairness.175 In this case, the basis would be
mostly humanistic—treating same-sex couples as equals.176 The
instrumental basis is less successful: married same-sex couples
cannot be forced to testify against each other going forward, but
forcing a spouse to share communications could have a lingering
effect as well. The damage is less significant than if married same-
sex spouses would not have the general privilege going forward, but
it is damage nonetheless.
Finally, the new privilege is supported by scholars. The modifica-
tion of the confidential marital communications privilege suggested
in this Note is entirely novel, and thus has not been directly ad-
dressed in the literature. Analogies can be drawn to Professor
Levinson’s argument for the extension of the privilege far beyond
simple marriage to include general close relationships as well.177
Before the Court’s decision in Obergefell, other scholars made
arguments for the expansion of the spousal privileges to same-sex
marriages unrecognized by the state.178 The one caveat to this
170. See supra Part II.
171. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, OBAMA ADMINISTRATION POLICY ADVANCEMENT ON BEHALF
OF LGBTQ AMERICANS (2015), http://hrc.or/resources/obama-administration-policy-legislative-
and-other-advancements-on-behalf-of [https://perma.cc/F5VZ-RDWG].
172. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
173. See Penfil, supra note 17, at 819.
174. See id. at 820-21.
175. See id. at 819-20 (noting that the humanistic rationale underlies the “natural repug-
nance” that early courts felt towards the idea of spouses being forced to testify against one
another); see also EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 2.3 (Westlaw 2015).
176. See Penfil, supra note 17, at 819-20.
177. See Levinson, supra note 74, at 651.
178. See Brannen, supra note 17, at 314.
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analysis is that there is more than a handful of scholars who deride
the decision in Obergefell179 and would probably argue against an
expansion of the privilege in favor of same-sex couples.
C. Proposed Test and Factors for Consideration
With the backdrop of Obergefell’s mandate to recognize same-sex
unions and a rich common-law tradition, federal judges should
interpret these precedents “in the light of reason and experience”180
to find that the marital communications privilege should extend to
couples that were barred from marrying pre-Obergefell. Proposals
for pre-Obergefell expansion of the marital privileges to unmarried
same-sex couples noted even then that the court could easily deter-
mine if the privilege applies by simply asking if “the couple would
legally marry if the option were available.”181 However, a more nu-
anced test based on the requirements of common-law marriage
would satisfy concerns of slap-dash application of the privilege, as
well as firmly root the new privilege in the history of the common
law.
Just as the court must determine whether a common-law
marriage existed as a question of fact,182 so should the court consider
as a question of fact whether a gay couple would have been married
but for unconstitutional laws. The threshold question is whether
the couple could have obtained a legal marriage in their state of
residence before the communication occurred. If they could have
done so the court should apply the rule for marital privileges as
already in place.
Primarily, the court should look to whether the couple held them-
selves out to members of their community as married or similar.
This, however, should not be read strictly: due to the history of
animus against homosexual relationships in American history183
179. See AM. PRINCIPLES PROJECT, Statement Calling for Constitutional Resistance to
Obergefell v. Hodges (Oct. 8, 2015), https://americanprinciplesproject.org/founding-principles/
statement-calling-for-constitutional-resistance-to-obergefell-v-hodges/ [https://perma.cc/9UJ5-
PAMA].
180. FED. R. EVID. 501
181. Brannen, supra note 17, at 338-39.
182. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
183. See generally MICHAEL BRONSKI, A QUEER HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (2011)
(chronicling instances of homophobic governmental action from Puritan Massachusetts
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many gay couples have not publicized their relationships beyond
close friends.184 This history of discrimination may lead to the un-
fortunate situation where two people of the same sex regard each
other as spouses but do not acknowledge the same to outsiders.
Such a “secret marriage” would in fact even bar a couple from re-
ceiving recognition as a common-law marriage.185 Thus a court
should look to whether the couple held themselves out as married
primarily to friends and family.
By the same token, although a ceremony can be taken as evidence
in favor of a finding that the couple would have been married, the
absence of a ceremony should not be taken as weighing against such
a finding. This squares with the general doctrine of common-law
marriage.186
Given that several states offered marriage-like alternatives in
the years before the legalization of gay marriage, if a same-sex
couple had taken advantage of such a law, it should be taken as dis-
positive of an intent to marry. Although some courts have treated
civil unions or domestic partnerships as synonymous with marriage,
others have already ruled otherwise.187 Furthermore, many expres-
sed disdain at the notion of civil unions as being an entrenchment
of “separate but equal” philosophy188 and did not take advantage of
those laws even when available.189
Just like any marriage, the court must also make sure that the
couple attempting to raise the privilege would have had the capacity
to marry at the time of the communication, had the law not limited
marriage to opposite-sex couples. These requirements can be taken
through the modern age).
184. For an excellent treatment of several high-profile but closeted “marriages” in
American history, see STREITMATTER, supra note 24.
185. See Ex parte Threet, 333 S.W.2d 361, 364-65 (Tex. 1960) (“Under the Texas decisions,
there can be no secret common law marriage as such.”).
186. See supra Part III.
187. See Commonwealth v. Clary, No. 11-CR-3329, at 6 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013) (order
denying the invocation of marital privilege) (“The fact that Vermont may extend the marital
privilege to couples who have entered into a civil union does not require Kentucky to do so.”).
188. Andrew Koppelman, The Decline and Fall of the Case against Same-Sex Marriage, 2
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 5, 13-15 (2004).
189. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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directly from the forum state’s laws, and usually include age,190
mental capacity,191 and consanguinity.192
CONCLUSION
Obergefell had an immediate and stunning effect on the
world—thousands of same-sex couples nearly immediately began
lining up at county clerks’ offices to obtain their own marriage
licenses. However, the promise of liberty in Obergefell must go
beyond the prospective granting of marriage licenses and include
the retroactive recognition of marriages in the limited circumstances
where to not do so would be a denial of the couple’s Due Process
right. The key example of such retroactive recognition lies in the
confidential marital communications privilege. Although this Note
does not delve into the other rights and benefits of marriage, there
is little reason why this analysis would not be applicable to those
rights. By assiduously demanding the rights denied to them, same-
sex couples might one day “achieve the full promise of liberty.”193
This Note focuses on the question of the confidential marital
communications privilege for same-sex couples for two reasons: first,
the unique nature of the privilege outlines one way in which same-
sex couples can continue to feel the stigma of discriminatory
marriage laws despite the holding in Obergefell; and second, the
solution to that injustice provided in this Note is entirely forward-
looking. Whether it be through concrete examples in the real
world194 or through fictional examples,195 this Note amply covered
the first rationale. The second reason is that arguing for an ex-
pansion of the confidential marital communications privilege—the
least criticized of the spousal privileges196—leaves the door open for
more radical applications of this Note’s analogy to common-law
marriage.
190. 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 14 (2015).
191. Id. § 15.
192. Id. § 17.
193. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). 
194. See supra Part I.A.
195. See supra Introduction.
196. Anne N. DePrez, Note, Pillow Talk, Grimgribbers and Connubial Bliss: The Marital
Communication Privilege, 56 IND. L.J. 121, 122 (1980).
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Same-sex couples have been denied the basic rights afforded to
opposite-sex couples since the founding of the United States.197 More
recently, and notably, that discrimination continued as the gay
rights movement coalesced and became a political force.198 Although
this Note argues for one way in which a future harm—the forced
divulgence of marital secrets—can be avoided, it also provides a
framework for addressing past harms, including by amending
previous years’ tax returns.199 Although outside the ambit of this
Note, an able litigator can use the retroactive recognition of same-
sex marriages argued herein to seek redress for the discriminatory
harms suffered by same-sex couples, such as the lack of marital
benefits in tax. It is up to the LGBTQ community to decide how far
to push this agenda—or if it is time to forgive and to forget past
harms while zealously protecting ourselves from future harms.
Steven A. Young*
197. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
198. See supra Part I.A.
199. In a forthcoming article, Professor Peter Nicolas addresses the “backdating” of same-
sex marriages for the purposes of tax and social security benefits. See Peter Nicolas,
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